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Introduction 
 
Does the concept of logical fallacy capture all cases of human ‘illogical moves’? In 
order to sketch an answer to this question I distinguish the concept of logical fallacy from the 
concept of logical error. Let the thesis that this distinction is philosophically significant (Stark 
2000) constitute the initial justification for setting the above question as an expression of the 
central problem of this paper. When making those conceptual analyses we should have in 
mind the obvious linguistic observation that either ‘logical fallacy’ or ‘logical error’ are 
ambiguous terms. Yet, I am interested in possibly the broadest understanding of these two 
terms. I initially understand ‘logical fallacy’ as any (‘non-material’) violation of the norms of 
argumentative discourse, and ‘illogical moves’ as such actions that violate norms of ‘logic’ 
governing certain human knowledge-seeking activities, such as reasoning, questioning or 
defining. 
The central question is set at the meta-theoretical level: I analyze two theoretical 
concepts: (1) the concept of fallacy – one of the central concepts established within the 
argumentation theory (fallacy theory) and (2) the concept of logical error. I aim at establishing 
the relation between the denotations of the two terms. Representative examples of the use of 
the term ‘logical fallacy’ are taken from works of argumentation theorists. 
The initial question points to another significant problem: what kind of general logical 
concepts are involved in describing illogical moves? This problem is connected to the issue 
indicated by Toulmin: 
 
On the one hand, there are cases which involve failures of rationality; on the other 
hand, cases which reflect changes in the very criteria of ‘rationality’ (Toulmin 1972, 
231). 
 
Although both of the quoted ‘cases’ are mutually dependent, and moreover the first one is 
obviously fundamental for the issue of the genesis of illogical thinking, the second one turns 
out to be the expression of the problem of describing and explaining non-logical moves. There 
is an initial difficulty in defining logical error: this concept is related to a set of mutually 
dependent concepts, among which the concept of rationality seems to be the most general. 
Thus in fact this is the problem of giving the criteria of human rational behavior. 
Those criteria have a normative character. So, the concept of logical error can be 
considered as a normative concept, for it provides the norms of logical correctness of 
thinking. The concept of fallacy is also a normative concept, for it gives the criteria of the 
correctness of argumentative discourse. It is illustrated by the fact that the crucial concepts in 
argumentation theory are often used in order to fulfill not only descriptive and explanatory, 
but also normative tasks (e.g. van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992, 9; Slob 2002, 179): 
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Although argumentation is a phenomenon of language use, it is clear that 
argumentative discourse, unlike conversation analysts seem to think, cannot be 
adequately dealt with by linguistics alone, certainly not as long as linguistics 
perseveres in its current descriptive preoccupation (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 
1992, 9). 
 
In my paper I defend three mutually dependent theses: 
 
T1: In many contexts the concept of logical error is used instead of the concept of logical 
fallacy (or simply fallacy) without any theoretical examination of the relation between these 
two concepts (e.g. Stark 2000). 
 
T2: The broad understanding of fallacy is close to capturing the idea of logical error. 
 
T3: The concept of logical error is much wider than that of logical fallacy and therefore it is 
able, and it indeed should, fulfill better the task of describing and explaining knowledge-
seeking activities and ‘illogical moves’ within them. 
 
The third thesis constitutes the answer to the initial question of my paper. 
 
 
The concept of logical fallacy 
 
My use of the term ‘logical fallacy’ is partly suggested by Whately’s distinction 
between logical fallacies and non-logical fallacies (e.g. Hamblin 1970, 169-171, van Eemeren 
2001, 144-145). By stressing the word ‘logical’ I want first to exclude from my considerations 
cases of ‘material fallacies’ and second – to show the link between the concept of 
argumentative fallacy and the concept of thought-error. 
Hence, the term ‘logical fallacy’ can be understood at least in two ways: 
 
(1) the deductive error in reasoning (formal fallacy), as illustrated by the following definition: 
 
We commit a fallacy when we reason or draw conclusions incorrectly (Kahane 1969, 244). 
 
(2) the error of all human activities, which appear within the argumentative discourse. 
 
Thus, the most significant term in most of standard definitions of  fallacy is ‘reasoning’ 
(Johnson 1987, 241). The definition of fallacy as an error in reasoning is treated as a broad 
understanding of fallacies (Ikuenobe 2002, 421). Errors in reasoning were sometimes 
understood as errors in logic, which is pointed out by Hansen (2002, 137). However, if ‘bad’ 
(illogical) reasoning accompanies any fallacious argument, the argumentation theory seems to 
be the one to give the most important and the most general answers to questions of correct 
reasoning. Many thinkers express this idea: 
 
The term ‘fallacy’ is our most general term for criticizing any general procedure (or 
what have you) used for the fixation of beliefs that has an unacceptably high tendency 
to generate false or unfounded beliefs relative to that procedure for fixing beliefs 
(Fogelin & Duggan 1987, 257). 
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What are such general analyses for? The answers within the argumentation theory are given in 
order to provide the criteria for distinguishing ‘logical thinking’ from ‘illogical thinking,’ 
since: 
 
Argumentation can be understood as a theory of logos in general, of which logic is 
built a part (Borel 1989, 1). 
 
We should here observe that when the concept of fallacy is considered within the 
argumentation theory it is related to the concept of rules – not only and not necessarily to the 
rules of logic, but to the rules of rational or reasonable discussion. Some authors distinguish 
rational discussion and reasonable discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1988, 272), 
however in this approach fallacy can be understood as any violation of discussion rules (e.g. 
van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1987, 1992). 
To sum up, any broad understanding what the logical fallacy is should allow us in the 
most general way to describe and to explain certain ‘bad’ reasoning processes and their results 
by indicating connections to certain rules (of logic, of discourse, of discussion). 
If we accept such a list of factors constituting the concept of fallacy, we can be 
naturally directed to the ‘epistemic approach’ to fallacies. In other words, we can draw the 
analogy between this theoretical attempt to ‘illogical moves’ and the understanding fallacies 
as ‘mistakes in knowledge-seeking’ (Hintikka 1987, 232). Let this last expression constitute 
the starting point for the transition from the concept of logical fallacy to the concept of logical 
error. 
 
 
The concept of logical error 
 
The term ‘logical error’ within philosophical, logical and argumentation-theoretical 
literature has two main meanings: 
 
(1) in a narrow sense logical error is understood as the (formal) violation of the rules of 
deductive inferences; 
(2) logical error in a broad sense is understood as any ‘illogical move’ (error made in the 
domain of thinking). 
 
This distinction could be illustrated by van Eemeren & Grootendorst (1992, 105), who 
distinguish the concept of fallacy as a broad concept from the narrow concept of the ‘logical 
error concerning validity.’ 
The concept of logical error is probably as old as the concept of rationality and for 
obvious reason; when one talks about the rationality of any sort of human behavior, one 
should give the criteria of distinguishing actions which can be called ‘rational’ from those 
which cannot. Since logic is understood as the tool of cognition (organon) we are justified in 
naming rational knowledge-seeking activities ‘logical.’ Every violation of the rules governing 
knowledge-seeking activities constitutes the ‘illogical’ behavior. Thus, the ‘negative’ concept 
of logical error accompanies every kind of ‘positive’ analyses concerning human ‘logical’ 
(‘rational’) actions. 
However, illogical cognitive actions seem to be not reducible to various 
‘argumentative mistakes’ captured by the term ‘fallacy’: 
 
When we engage in discursive thought and declarative speech we may attain various 
forms of success: intelligibility, precision, correctness, and so on. These felicities are 
 3 
M. Koszowy’s ”On the Concepts of Logical Fallacy and Logical Error” 
best explained by contrast with the corresponding mishaps that threaten our beliefs, 
assertions and especially our claims to know something (Thalberg 1967, 45-46). 
 
These cases of inadequate thinking can be named in various ways. In order to describe 
them, one can talk for example about ‘thought-stoppers,’ ‘logically-odd assertions,’ ‘self-
refuting slogans,’ cases of ‘shoddy thinking,’ ‘logically-interesting bad thinking,’ ‘thought-
impeding errors’ or even ‘logical viruses’ (Stark 2000). These, and other expressions describe 
violations of thinking procedures or violations in knowledge-seeking: 
 
Knowledge is invariably a mental experience directly or indirectly beneficial to us. If, 
however, the judgement does not stand up, we call it an error (Mach 1976, 84). 
 
Now, the central question arises again: if  we accept such a broad definition of logical fallacy, 
why should we at all introduce the term ‘logical error’ as a better term? Is the term ‘logical 
fallacy’ not good enough to fulfill the same set of tasks? 
 
 
Defending the distinction 
 
1.  At first glance the answer to the central question seems to be obvious: we do not need 
the two concepts for the broad concept of fallacy captures all cases of human ‘illogical 
moves.’ There are two arguments in its favor. 
The first argument is that argumentation is the ‘natural environment’ of human 
cognitive errors. Since conscious argumentative actions involve cognition by explaining 
cognitive errors we may also explain other errors. Among others, the traditional, Aristotelian 
and the post-Aristotelian approaches to fallacies show that different sorts of cognitive errors 
can be analyzed within the area of argumentation. 
The crucial argument for this thesis is that traditional approach to fallacies deals with 
the problem of errors made in different domains of human knowledge-seeking activities. In 
other words, although errors made by human beings within the domain of thinking and 
cognizing cannot be grasped only within the narrow scope of the argumentative discourse, the 
argumentative situation is the one, within which all common sorts of human cognitive errors 
appear. 
This argument can be supported by another one: although there are many sorts of 
cognitive activities such as reasoning, defining, questioning etc., where the same kinds of 
cognitive and linguistic errors are committed, the field of argumentative discourse is the one 
where we can perform all those activities. 
The second argument for the positive answer to our main question is that the concept 
of fallacy is within the argumentation theory (fallacy theory) well theoretically and formally 
developed and therefore it is easily applicable to other research domains. It is hard to find 
such sophisticated and general analyses of the concept of ‘illogical move’ within other sorts 
of theories concerning knowledge-seeking activities (e.g. definition theory). Therefore the 
argumentation theory gives the best possible answers to the question concerning incorrect 
thinking. The variety of theoretical approaches to fallacies show that there are significant 
discussions that lead to elaborate the concept of fallacy as a good theoretical concept fulfilling 
a variety of tasks not only within different argumentation-theoretical approaches, but also as a 
good general theoretical concept which would describe, explain and even give the criteria of 
human unreasonableness. 
If we accept those arguments we should agree that introducing the concept of logical 
error is simply useless. 
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2.  The most significant counter-argument against the first claim is that Aristotle tailored 
his concept of fallacy for a particular domain of argumentation; so many problems concerning 
errors were insufficiently considered; thus, his concept does not cover the whole ‘environment 
of error.’ In other words, the problem of criteria for good thinking is tailored within the 
argumentation theory to the narrow scope of issues concerning the argumentative discourse. 
This situation seems to be specific, since there are many factors constituting the common 
situation of the language use such as the genesis of error, which cannot be grasped by 
argumentation theory. 
The second counter-argument is that the development of logic (e.g. Descartes, Bacon, 
Port Royal, Locke) shows that the understanding of fallacies depends at least on the 
understanding of: 
 
(1) the goal of (scientific) cognition - since the fulfillment of the goal is the measure of the 
correctness of cognition:  
 
Knowledge and error flow from the same mental sources, only success can tell one 
from another’ (Mach 1976, 84). 
 
which is strictly connected to the understanding of 
 
(2) the (scientific) method: 
 
When there is an error it is likely that the relation between our method of handling 
something, and what we are attempting to handle is faulty’ (Srzednicki 1998, 11). 
 
and as well as on understanding of many other interrelated concepts: (3) (scientific) language, 
(4) logic, (5) rationality, (6) reasonableness and (7) rules (of logic, of rationality or of the 
discourse). 
At first glance one can see that these concepts are mutually dependent. The way of 
understanding one of them entails the way of understanding other concepts. In that respect 
these concepts seem to constitute a kind of ‘family’ in the Wittgensteinian sense (Wittgenstein 
1953, § 67). For example, the understanding of the goal (1), method (2), language (3), logic 
(4), and finally rules (7) depends on the understanding of rationality (5) and reasonableness 
(6), because the method, language, etc. should be rational or reasonable. 
As an example, let me very briefly examine the concept of logic in the context of the 
concept of logical error. I am taking the link between these two concepts as an example 
because (a) the word ‘logic’ is present in both and (b) because this link seems to be one of the 
most representative for the link of the concept of logical error to the other concepts. This link 
seems also important because (c) ‘logic is traditionally seen as a protection against errors in 
thinking’ (Woleński 1998, 27) and therefore (d) as we understand logical error as the violation 
of some norms, we intuitively point out the rules of logic as the set of these norms (I 
understand ‘logic’ broadly as some system of rules of rationality). 
This link raises the problematic issue of defining logical error. Giving an adequate 
definition of logical error seems to be just impossible because of the number of concepts of 
logic itself. For example, this view is quoted by Żarnecka-Biały:  
 
‘How can we trust in logic as a tool against error-making’ – one can continue asking – 
‘if we do not know what we are speaking about? We have infinitely many systems in 
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logic, based on different tricks of syntax or semantics and in fact no one knows what 
relation these systems have to our natural logical skills’ (Żarnecka-Biały 1998, 30). 
 
This sort of problem is also significant for the relation of the concept of logical error to all the 
other concepts which I have mentioned above. 
Thus, the counter-argument against the second claim is that analyses of the idea of 
illogical incorrectness (the concept of ‘illogical move’) demand something more than the 
analysis of the criteria of the correctness (reasonableness) of an argument; it demands no less 
than establishing Toulmin’s ‘criteria of rationality.’ 
As I mentioned above, fallacy can be also defined as the violation of the rules of 
human rational behavior – as the violation of discussion rules (e.g. van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst 1992, 102-106). Thus, it seems that the concept of logical error understood this 
way is wider than the concept of fallacy as explained above – simply because of the wider 
domain of application. The concept of fallacy seems to be applicable exclusively to the 
situation of the argumentative discourse. 
The third counter-argument can be formulated as follows: there are some violations 
within the argumentative discourse which are not fallacies (Stark 2000). This is the counter-
argument against both the first and the second argument. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Although the concept of logical error depends on the understanding of many 
ambiguous general logical and epistemological terms it is a useful concept. Moreover, 
paradoxically, this difficulty turns out to be the fundamental strength of the concept of logical 
error for it is a philosophical concept at least because of its (1) generality and (2) dependence 
on other concepts traditionally seen as philosophical. Intuitions concerning such a general 
notion can be found in writings of Polish philosophers such as e.g. Ajdukiewicz, Kotarbiński, 
Kamiński, Żarnecka-Biały and Woleński. According to Perelman (1977, 43-51) the crucial 
role in the genesis and history of rhetoric (understood as the art of persuasion) was played by 
its link to philosophy. This is the argument for the usefulness of general-philosophical 
concepts for the study of argumentation. The concept of logical error is one of such concepts. 
Thus, I claim that the concept of logical error fulfills (and after all is able to fulfill) the task of 
a kind of the general-philosophical concept which the concept of fallacy does not (in all the 
cases). And this is the pragmatic need of distinguishing the concept of logical error from that 
of fallacy – what I defended in my paper – and theoretically elaborating it – what can be a 
good research project. As a matter of fact, the philosophical character of the concept of logical 
error constitutes additional argument for maintaining the distinction between this concept and 
that of logical fallacy. 
I do not of course aim at eliminating the concept of (logical) fallacy and establishing a 
‘new’ concept of logical error instead. There is a need of introducing another theoretical 
concept – that of logical error. If one accepts my thesis that within any informal-logical study 
one should elaborate or at least consider the general issue of logical incorrectness of human 
thought, one should also agree that one should elaborate at least some initial concept of 
logical error. If one does not agree, then the concept of fallacy is sufficient. 
This approach raises an important issue: how can we use the traditional and 
contemporary notions of logical fallacy in analyses of logical error – not only in the domain 
of language and argumentation, but also in that of cognition and thinking? According to some 
contemporary theoretical approaches, argumentation theory has various dimensions: e.g. 
social, psychological, linguistic, etc. The same dimensions should be ascribed to the concept 
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of the unreasonableness of an argument, since ‘the notion of reasonableness is related to the 
context of resolving a difference of opinion’ (van Eemeren, Meuffels & Verburg 2000, 419). 
This unreasonableness can be well described and explained by the idea (concept) of logical 
error. 
Furthermore, the acceptance of the broadest understanding of logical error could lead 
us to quite unexpected conclusions. The logical error in a wide sense can be for example 
understood as a cognitive error – error in the domain of cognizing. Then, for example Mach’s 
approach (1976) could count as psychological analyses of logical errors. If we understand 
fallacies epistemologically as mistakes in processes of gaining knowledge, it seems we need 
to consider the psychological background (genesis) of those mistakes, which are for example 
considered by Wiland (2003). The link between the study of linguistic errors and the 
psychological research is pointed out very clearly: 
 
In fact, the study of errors is a royal road to understanding how concepts are 
unconsciously organized and activated. Psychologists have known for a long time that 
slips of the tongue can provide enlightening glimpses into the mechanisms of 
cognition. By studying such errors, one can learn much about the mind without doing 
any formal psychological experiments (Hofstadter & Moser 1989, 185). 
 
The logical error understood as a case or a result of ‘illogical thinking’ can be also considered 
as irrational thinking, and in particular as ‘irrational belief,’ or even irrational actions (e.g. 
Pears 1988). 
Moreover, within those ‘irrational (illogical) actions,’ even immoral actions can be 
counted as logical errors (e.g. Nichols 2002). 
Among the above complicated issues let me mention the one which seems to be 
simple, but also generates serious problems. Can inductive inferences in experimental science 
be called ‘logical errors’? By pointing it out I do not mean the obvious cases of ‘inductive 
fallacies’ such as the fallacy of hasty generalization or of weak analogy. The problem 
concerns the fact that inductive reasoning is not certain. Can the statistical inferences in 
science (e.g. Mayo 1996) be treated as logical errors just for the obvious reason that human 
reasoning based on sensually experienced data is ‘naturally’ non-conclusive? 
My last remark is that if the concept of logical error can be well applied to so many 
domains it is much more general that the concept of fallacy (what I hope I have shown). If 
generality is one of the factors determining the philosophical character of a concept, then the 
concept of logical error certainly belongs to philosophy. Although this conclusion sounds 
trivial – one may truly claim that the concept of logical error already is the philosophical 
concept – this concept is necessary to be examined to become the sound philosophical 
concept fulfilling some important philosophical tasks. I just hope I have drawn the initial map 
of such tasks. 
 
 
Notes 
 
I owe thanks to Dr Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik for helpful comments on the earlier draft. 
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